Mercer Law Review
Volume 52
Number 2 Lead Articles Edition - A Symposium Brown v. Board of Education: An Exercise in
Advocacy

Article 12

3-2001

Ohler v. United States: Defendants Waive Appellate Review by
Reducing the Sting of Prior Conviction Impeachment Evidence
Misty Dawn Garrett

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Garrett, Misty Dawn (2001) "Ohler v. United States: Defendants Waive Appellate Review by Reducing the
Sting of Prior Conviction Impeachment Evidence," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 52 : No. 2 , Article 12.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol52/iss2/12

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

CASENOTE

Ohler v. United States: Defendants Waive
Appellate Review By Reducing the Sting of
Prior Conviction Impeachment Evidence

In Ohler v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court adopted
a per se waiver rule holding that a defendant waives the right to appeal
an in limine ruling permitting the government to impeach the defendant
with evidence of a prior conviction when the defendant introduced the
evidence on direct examination in an effort to reduce the sting of the
evidence.2
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In July 1997, Maria Suzuki Ohler attempted to enter the United
States from Mexico through San Ysidro, California. A customs inspector
searched Ohler's van and noticed that someone tampered with an
interior panel. The inspector found approximately eighty-one pounds of
marijuana in the panel.3 Ohler was arrested and subsequently indicted
on August 6, 1997, for importation of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C.

1.
2.
3.

120 S. Ct. 1851 (2000).
Id. at 1855.
Id. at 1852.
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§§ 952 and 960 and for possession of 4marijuana with intent to distribute
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Before trial the government filed a motion in limine seeking to admit
Ohler's 1993 felony conviction for possession of methamphetamine under
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) ("Rule 404(b)") 5 and Federal Rule of
Evidence 609(a)(1) ("Rule 609(a)(1)"). ' The district court denied the
government's motion to admit Ohler's conviction under Rule 404(b), but
reserved ruling on the motion to admit Ohler's conviction under Rule
609(a)(1). On the first day of Ohler's trial, the district court ruled that
her conviction was admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule
609(a)(1) if she testified on her own behalf.7
Ohler testified at trial and denied knowledge of the hidden marijuana.
She also attempted to take the sting out of the impeachment evidence
by admitting that she had previously been convicted of possession of
methamphetamine.
On cross-examination, Ohler answered in the
affirmative when the prosecutor asked her whether her prior conviction
was a felony conviction. On redirect examination, Ohler explained that
her conviction was merely for possession of a personal-use quantity, not
a distribution quantity. The jury found Ohler guilty of both counts, and
the court sentenced her to thirty months' imprisonment and three years
of supervised release; it also assessed a $200 penalty.8
Ohler appealed, arguing that the district court erred by admitting
evidence of her drug possession conviction under Rule 609(a)(1). Ohler

4. United States v. Ohler, 169 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1999).
5.

FED. R. EVID. 404(b). This rule provides:

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial,
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the
general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
6. FED. R. EVID. 609(a). This rule provides:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or

imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall
be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted
if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.

7. Ohler, 169 F.3d at 1201.
8. Id. at 1201-02.

2001]

OHLER V. UNITED STATES

contended that before the 1990 amendment to Rule 609(a)(1), the literal
language of the rule suggested that prior conviction impeachment
evidence was only admissible during cross-examination s Therefore,
because the 1990 amendment to Rule 609(a)(1) removed the language
suggesting the restriction, the amended rule specifically sanctioned the
strategy of allowing a defendant to remove the sting of impeachment
evidence on direct examination. 10 Ohler argued that her use of this
strategy should not act as a bar to appellate review of the trial court's
decision to admit the evidence. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected Ohler's argument." The court explained that, even before the
amendment, some courts held that the cross-examination limitation of
Rule 609(a)(1) was inapplicable and permitted defendants to reduce the
sting by introducing impeachment evidence on direct examination. 2
Furthermore, the court found that the rule amendment did not address
the issue of whether the defendant waived appeal of the trial court's
ruling admitting the prior conviction. 3 The court of appeals concluded
that Ohler waived her objection to the admissibility of the prior
conviction by introducing evidence of the conviction during her direct
examination.'4
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether appellate review of an in limine ruling permitting prior
conviction impeachment evidence is available when a defendant
introduces the conviction during direct examination.' 5 The Court

9. Before the 1990 amendment, Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provided:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public
record duringcross-examinationbut only if the crime (1) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
Id. at 1202 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 609 (amended 1990)) (emphasis added).
10. Id. The 1990 amendment to Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence removed the
reference to the cross-examination limitation on impeachment evidence of prior conviction.
The Advisory Committee noted that the apparent limitation had been found inapplicable
by "virtually every circuit." FED. R. EVID. 609 1990 Amendment.
11. 169 F.3d at 1203.
12. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's note). See United States v. Bad
Cob, 560 F.2d 877, 883 (8th Cir. 1977) ("The introduction by a witness himself, on his
direct, of a prior conviction is a common trial tactic, recommended by textwriters on trial
practice.") (footnote omitted); United States v. Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079, 1082 n.2 (9th Cir.
1976).
13. 169 F.3d at 1203.
14. Id. at 1204.
15. 120 S. Ct. at 1853.
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affirmed the court of appeals decision holding that a defendant who
introduces evidence of a prior conviction during direct examination in an
attempt to reduce the sting of impeachment evidence waives appellate
review of the alleged erroneous admission of the evidence."
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

It has long been a general trial strategy for a defendant to mitigate
the damaging effect of prior conviction impeachment evidence by
introducing the conviction during direct examination. 17 This tactic
serves two purposes: It "takes the sting out of [the evidence] by
preventing the prosecutor from bringing it out [first]," and it gives the
defense attorney "the opportunity to excuse or explain [the conviction]
in the most satisfactory way."" If a defendant does not explain or
reveal his prior conviction on direct examination, a jury may think the
defendant is being dishonest and trying to hide the conviction. 19
Therefore, a defendant who loses a motion in limine ruling allowing the
admissibility of prior conviction evidence is motivated to introduce the
harmful evidence before the prosecutor in order to reduce the prejudicial
effect on the jury.2
While a defendant's attempt to reduce the sting of this evidence was
a commonly used trial strategy before the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, there was no uniform approach to determine whether a
defendant waived his right to appeal a motion in limine ruling allowing
the admission of prior conviction impeachment evidence when a
defendant introduced this evidence on direct examination. For example,
the Second Circuit in United States v. Puco2' held that the defendant
can appeal the trial judge's decision allowing the admission of evidence
of the defendant's conviction for violating federal narcotics laws even
when the strategy was employed.22 The court explained that a defendant is "entitled to attempt to offset the prejudicial effect of admission
of his prior conviction by referring to it before the government [does] and
by using it to support his defense."23 Likewise, the District of Columbia

16.
17.

Id. at 1855.
See IRVING GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TECHNIQUE

§ 328

(1935); IRVING MENDELSON,

DEFENDING CRIMINAL CASES. ADDITIONAL MATERIALS BY ISIDORE SILVER 91-93 (Rev. ed.
1967); F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLATT, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES FOR CRIMINAL

TRIALS

§

253 (1971).

18. BAILEY & ROTHBLATT, supra note 17, § 253, at 222.
19. Id. at 222-23.
20. Id.

21. 453 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1971).
22. Id. at 541-42.
23. Id. at 541 n.6.
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Circuit in United States v. Maynard24 permitted the defendant to
appeal the trial judge's ruling admitting impeachment evidence of the
defense's key witness's prior arrest when the defendant made the
25
"tactical decision" to introduce this evidence on direct examination.
The court explained that the defendant was "fairly entitled" to "do what
he fairly could to limit the prejudicial impact of the ruling."26
However, in Shorter v. United States,27 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a defendant who offers prior conviction impeachment
evidence after the court has ruled the evidence admissible over the
defendant's objection cannot then complain that the introduction of the
evidence violated his constitutional rights.2" There, defendant offered
this evidence as a "matter of trial strategy, probably to soften the
anticipated blow in the eyes of the jury."29 But the court opined, "[T]he
better practice is to make an objection" when the evidence is about to be
presented by the government in cross-examination.30 The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Hauff,31 also held that,
when the defendant introduces prior conviction impeachment evidence,
the defendant waives the right to object to its admission even if the
defendant's prior conviction is on appeal and subject to reversal.32
After Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975,
defendants continued to introduce prior conviction evidence on direct
examination in order to reduce the sting of the evidence as part of trial
strategy.3 3 Rule 103 of the Federal Rules of Evidence sets forth the
requirements for appealing evidentiary claims,34 but it does not address

24. 476 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
25. Id. at 1174.
26. Id. at 1175.
27. 412 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1969).
28. Id. at 431. See United States v. Tocki, 469 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding
that there is no abuse of discretion by trial judge admitting prior conviction impeachment
evidence when defendant offers the evidence on direct examination).
29. 412 F.2d at 431.
30. Id. at 431 n.4.

31.

395 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1968).

32. Id. at 557.
33. See Bad Cob, 560 F.2d at 883 (holding "[tihe introduction by a witness himself, on
his direct, of a prior conviction is a common trial tactic, recommended by textwriters on

trial practice"); see also FED. R. EVID. 609 1990 Amendment (noting "[iut is common for
witnesses to reveal on direct examination their convictions to 'remove the sting' of the
impeachment").

34. FED. R. EVID. 103. This rule provides in pertinent part:
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
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waiver of objection when a defendant introduces evidence on direct
examination after losing an in limine ruling allowing the opponent to
admit evidence.35 Likewise, Rule 609 does not address the issue.3" In
the absence of specific direction in the Federal Rules of Evidence on the
issue of whether the defendant waives appellate review of a motion in
limine ruling allowing the introduction of prior conviction impeachment
evidence when the defendant introduces this evidence,37 the circuit
courts continued to split on the issue-some holding the defendant
waived appellate review and some holding the defendant did not waive
appellate review.3"

(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection
or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the
specific ground was not apparent from the context ....
An amendment to Rule 103(a), effective December 1, 2000, adds: "Once the court makes
a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial,
a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for
appeal." FED. R. EVID. 103 (amended 2000).
35. Id. The Advisory Committee's Note on the 2000 Amendment to Rule 103 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent part: "The amendment does not purport
to answer whether a party who objects to evidence that the court finds admissible in a
definitive ruling, and who then offers the evidence to 'remove the sting' of its anticipated
prejudicial effect, thereby waives the right to appeal the trial court's ruling."
36. FED. R. EVID. 609. This rule provides in pertinent part:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall
be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused ....
37. Id.
38. See FED. R. EVID. 103 Advisory Committee's Note (amended 2000). The note
addresses the split in the circuits:
See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 106 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 1997) (where the trial
judge ruled in limine that the government could use a prior conviction to impeach
the defendant if he testified, the defendant did not waive his right to appeal by
introducing the conviction on direct examination); Judd v. Rodman, 105 F.3d 1339
(11th Cir. 1997) (an objection made in limine is sufficient to preserve a claim of
error when the movant, as a matter of trial strategy, presents the objectionable
evidence herself on direct examination to minimize its prejudicial effect); Gill v.
Thomas, 83 F.3d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 1996) ("by offering the misdemeanor evidence
himself, Gill waived his opportunity to object and thus did not preserve the issue
for appeal"); United States v. Williams, 939 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1991) (objection to
impeachment evidence was waived when the defendant was impeached on direct
examination).
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The Supreme Court addressed a related issue in Luce v. United
States.39 In Luce defendant made an in limine motion seeking to
preclude the government from using a prior conviction for impeachment.
The district court denied the motion, and Luce, therefore, did not testify.
On appeal, Luce contended that the district judge erred in ruling that
the evidence would be admissible." The Court concluded that Luce did
not preserve a claim of error based on the trial court's in limine ruling
41
because he failed to testify and the evidence was never introduced.
The Court reasoned that when a defendant does not testify, the
reviewing court is prevented from "determin[ing] the impact any
erroneous impeachment may have had in light of the record as a whole"
because the court does not know the "nature of the defendant's
testimony" and does not know whether in fact the ruling kept the
defendant from testifying.4 2 Thus, the Court held that in order for a
defendant to preserve appellate review of an error in admitting prior
conviction impeachment evidence, the defendant must testify at trial.4 s
Luce put an end to the confusion regarding whether a defendant
waived review of the admissibility of prior conviction impeachment
evidence when the defendant does not testify, but the Court left open the
issue of waiver when a defendant does testify and brings out the
evidence on direct examination." The circuit courts, applying Luce to
situations in which a defendant testifies, have not taken a uniform
approach. For example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United
States v.Fisher,45 held that a defendant does not waive his right to
object to the introduction of prior conviction impeachment evidence when
he introduces the evidence in an attempt to reduce the damage from the

39. 469 U.S. 38 (1984).
40. Id. at 39-40.
41. Id. at 43.
42. Id. at 41-42.
43. Id. at 43.
44. Id. at 41. However, as Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent in Ohler v. United
States, the Court in Luce implied that the defendant does not waive appellate review when
impeachment evidence is introduced when the Court stated that:
It is clear, of course, that had petitioner testified and been impeached by
evidence of a prior conviction, the District Court's decision to admit the
impeachment evidence would have been reviewable on appeal along with any
other claims of error. The Court of Appeals would then have had a complete
record detailing the nature of petitioner's testimony, the scope of the crossexamination, and the possible impact of impeachment on the jury's verdict.
120 S. Ct. at 1856 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting).
45. 106 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 1997).
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evidence.4 The court explained that when the government receives a
favorable ruling allowing the introduction of evidence that, when
introduced during cross-examination, may harm the defendant, a
defendant "is faced with a difficult dilemma: to refrain from testifying
in his own defense, or risk impeachment by the opposite side." 7 The
court reasoned that a waiver rule preventing defendant from raising the
issue on appeal "goes against basic notions of fairness."4 8 Therefore,
the court concluded that a defendant is not precluded from reducing the
"highly prejudicial effect of that evidence" and is not deemed to have
waived appellate review of the pretrial ruling.49
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Judd v. Rodman, ° applied
the same principle to a motion in limine ruling on another type of
evidence.5
In an action for wrongful transmission of a sexually
transmitted disease, Judd moved in limine to exclude evidence of her
prior sexual history under Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.52
When the court overruled Judd's motion, she presented this evidence on
direct examination. 3 The court held that Judd's introduction of the
evidence was "valid trial strategy,"
5 4 and therefore, she did not waive her
objection to the pretrial ruling.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Wilson v. Williams5 also
refused to adopt a per se waiver rule when a party admits prior
conviction impeachment evidence on direct examination after the trial
judge has ruled the evidence admissible.56 The court recognized that
some courts have held "that a litigant who loses an evidentiary ruling
and then offers the evidence himself has waived any opportunity to

46. Id. at 629. See Reyes v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 589 F.2d 791, 793 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979)
(holding that a motion in limine is sufficient to preserve for appeal objection to the
introduction of prior conviction evidence when a party brings the evidence out on direct

examination in an effort to reduce the damaging effects of the evidence).

47.

106 F.3d at 629.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 105 F.3d 1339 (lth Cir. 1997).
51. Id. at 1342.
52. Id. at 1342-43. Rule 412(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent
part: "(a) Evidence generally inadmissible. The following evidence is not admissible
in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct... (1) Evidence
offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior; (2) Evidence
offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition."
53. 105 F.3d at 1342.
54. Id.
55. 182 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 1999).
56. Id. at 566-67.
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complain about the decision in limine."57 However, the court refused
to follow this holding because it "gives up one of the principal benefits
of the pretrial-ruling procedure," which is "to avoid the delay and
occasional prejudice caused by objections and offers of proof at trial.""8
The court distinguished this situation, in which a defendant preemptively introduced the evidence after the trial court made a definitive ruling,
from the situation in which a defendant preemptively introduces the
evidence before the trial court makes a definitive ruling.59 The court
concluded that the defendant waives his objection if the trial judge's
ruling is "conditional or tentative" but not if the ruling is definitive.6 °
However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v.
Williams,"' held that defendant waived his right to appeal the district
court's in limine ruling admitting prior conviction impeachment evidence
under Rule 609(a) when defendant introduced the evidence during direct
examination. 2 The court reasoned that defendant "made a strategic
decision to introduce the evidence preemptively, to soften its anticipated
effect on the jury,"3 and "'cannot now be heard to complain that his
own act of offering such evidence"' was error.64 The court noted that
if a defendant is allowed to introduce this evidence on direct examination, the trial court is precluded from reversing its ruling on the
admissibility of the evidence, and the government is precluded from
deciding not to introduce the evidence on cross-examination; therefore,
there is the risk of possible reversal on appeal.65 The court concluded
that the defense attorney should not be permitted to "deprive[] the court
and the government of a last chance to reverse their pre-stated
positions" on the admissibility of the impeachment evidence and thus,
adopted a per se waiver rule.66

57. Id. at 566. See United States v. Williams, 939 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1991); Gill
v. Thomas, 83 F.3d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 1996).
58. 182 F.3d at 566.

59. Id. at 566-67.
60. Id. See United States v. DePriest, 6 F.3d 1201, 1209 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that
a defendant waives the right to appellate review by introducing prior conviction evidence
before the trial judge makes a definitive ruling).
61. 939 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1991).

62. Id. at 725.
63. Id. at 724.
64. Id. at 723 (quoting Shorter v. United States, 412 F.2d 428, 431 (9th Cir. 1969)). See
United States v. Bryan, 534 F.2d 205, 206 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding no error when defendant
first introduced prior conviction into evidence); United States v. Hauff, 395 F.2d 555, 557
(7th Cir. 1968) (holding defendant waived appeal of prior conviction evidence when
defendant's attorney introduced the evidence when defendant testified).

65. 939 F.2d at 724-25.
66. Id.
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Similarly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v.
Smiley,67 adopted a per se waiver rule when defendant introduced the
prior conviction evidence during his direct examination.6" Likewise, in
Gill v. Thomas,6 9 the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that, by
offering the evidence himself, defendant "waived his opportunity to
object." 70 The court noted that defendant made a tactical decision and
"'opened the door'" to cross-examination on prior conviction evidence
to complain that his own offer of
and, therefore, "cannot now be heard
71
such evidence was reversible error."
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Ohler, neither common law nor
case law following the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence
definitively and uniformly answered the question of whether a defendant
waives appellate review of a ruling allowing the admissibility of prior
conviction impeachment evidence when the defendant introduces the
evidence on direct examination. The Supreme Court addressed this
issue specifically in Ohler to resolve the disagreements among the lower
72

courts.

III.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT

Writing for a five-to-four majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered
the opinion of the Court in Ohler.73 The Court affirmed the circuit
court and held that a defendant waives objection to an in limine ruling
permitting the admission of impeachment evidence of the defendant's
prior conviction when the defendant introduces the evidence during
direct examination.74 Chief Justice Rehnquist began his analysis by
setting forth the general evidentiary principle that "a party introducing
evidence cannot complain on appeal that the evidence was erroneously
admitted."7 5 Ohler, by invoking Rules 103 and 609(a), sought to "avoid
76
the consequences of this well-established commonsense principle."
The Court examined the plain language of Rules 103 and 609(a) and

67. 997 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1993).
68. Id. at 480. See United States v. Brown, 956 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Vega, 776 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Johnson, 720 F.2d 519 (8th Cir.
1983).
69. 83 F.3d 537 (1st Cir. 1996).
70. Id. at 541.
71. Id.
72. 120 S. Ct. at 1852-53.
73. Id. at 1852.
74. Id. at 1852-53.
75. Id. at 1853 (citing 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 103.14, 103-30 (2d ed. 2000)).

76. Id.
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concluded that these rules simply do not address whether or not
evidence introduced by a defendant on direct examination is appealable
as erroneously admitted." Rule 103 only provides "that a party must
make a timely objection to a ruling admitting evidence and that a party
cannot challenge an evidentiary ruling unless it affects a substantial
right."78 Rule 609(a) "merely identifies the situations in which a
witness' prior conviction may be admitted for impeachment purposes."79
to support
Therefore, the Court held that there is no statutory basis
8°
Ohler's allegation that she did not waive appellate review.
The Court then analyzed whether applying a waiver rule of this sort
unfairly "compels a defendant to forgo the tactical advantage of
preemptively introducing the conviction in order to appeal the in limine
ruling."8 Ohler argued that in order for a defendant to retain the
option of appealing the admissibility of the prior conviction impeachment
evidence pursuant to the waiver rule, the defendant is forced to give up
the right of introducing the evidence on direct examination, thus risking
the jury's doubting defendant's credibility once the evidence is introduced on cross-examination.82 The Court explained that, pursuant to
the adversarial trial process, both the defendant and the government
must make strategic choices throughout the trial that are a part of
normal criminal trial rules.83 The Court recognized that the defendant
has certain choices to make: (1) whether to testify in her own behalf,
which automatically subjects her to cross-examination that may include
damaging impeachment by any prior convictions; (2) if she does testify,
whether to introduce evidence of prior convictions on direct examination
to reduce the sting of such adverse evidence; and (3) whether to wait for
the possibility that this evidence will be introduced on cross-examination, which could be more harmful to the defendant.8 4
In addition, the Court noted that the Government also has to make
certain choices during the trial: (1) whether to impeach the defendant
with evidence of a prior conviction after the defendant testifies and (2)
whether to refuse to impeach the defendant with prior conviction
evidence because the decision to impeach may be reversed on appeal.8 5
The Court then explained that Ohler wants to take the decision of

77.

Id.

78. Id. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
79. Id. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

80. Id.
81. Id.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at 1854.
Id.
Id.
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whether or not to impeach a defendant away from the Government by
offering the conviction herself on direct examination and "still preserve
its admission as a claim of error on appeal." 6 However, pursuant to
the Court's decision in Luce,87 a defendant can claim a denial of a
substantial right on appeal if the district court's in limine ruling proved
to be erroneous only when the Government exercised its option to elicit
the testimony on cross-examination.8
Finally, the Court addressed defendant's third contention that
applying a waiver rule "unconstitutionally burdens her right to
testify." 9 The Court explained that although the waiver rule "may
deter a defendant from taking the stand" because a defendant will be
subject to cross-examination and impeachment by prior conviction
evidence, the rule does not prevent a defendant from taking the
stand.' The Court concluded that "'it is not thought inconsistent with
the enlightened administration of criminal justice to require the
defendant to weigh such pros and cons in deciding whether to testify.'""s Accordingly, the Court found that a defendant who introduces
impeachment evidence on direct examination may not appeal the
admissibility of that evidence.92
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
dissented, contending that the majority's waiver rule contains no
precedential, evidentiary, or trial practice support.93 Justice Souter
first disagreed with the majority's reliance on Luce in which the Court
held that a defendant who does not testify in his own defense cannot
appeal a motion in limine ruling permitting the admissibility of prior
conviction impeachment evidence.94 The Court in Luce reasoned that
because the defendant did not testify and the impeachment never
occurred, appellate review would be impossible without a record from
which to determine whether or not the defendant was harmed by the in
limine ruling.9 5 According to Justice Souter, Luce "merely acknowledged the incapacity of an appellate court to assess the significance of
the ruling for a defendant who remains silent" and, therefore, did not

86. Id.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 46-54.
88.

120 S. Ct. at 1854-55. See FED. R. EVID. 103.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

120 S. Ct. at 1855.
Id.
Id. (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971)).
Id.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1856.
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control the instant case.96 Justice Souter also disagreed with the
majority's reliance on the "'commonsense"' rule that "'a party introducing evidence cannot complain on appeal that the evidence was erroneously admitted.'"97 This principle simply does not reach the situation in
which a defendant opposes the admissibility of evidence and then
introduces it only to "mitigate its effect in the hands of her adversary"
by evidentiary scholarship as an exception to
and is, therefore, treated
98
the general principle.
Justice Souter then analyzed the rationale and policy concerns
underlying the practical application of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
He noted that under Rule 102, the rules "'shall be construed to secure
fairness in administration ...

to the end that the truth may be

Justice Souter
ascertained and proceedings justly determined.'" 9
explained that when a defendant admits to a prior conviction on direct
examination, the factfinder is more inclined to scrutinize carefully all the
further testimony of the defendant in order to come to a just result. °°
But when a defendant chooses to conceal prior convictions that are later
elicited on cross-examination, the factfinder is less inclined to believe the
defendant and may discount her testimony, which will impede the
factfinder's duty of ascertaining the truth. ' °1 Justice Souter concluded
that the majority's waiver rule discourages the defendant from introducing any evidence of prior conviction and, thus, is "antithetical to
dispassionate factfinding in support of a sound conclusion."0 2 However, the majority of the Court concluded that the waiver rule is sound,
fair, and unburdensome to defendants.' 3
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The holding in Ohler establishes that under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, once the trial judge has made a definitive ruling that evidence

96. Id.
97. Id.
98.

Id. (citing 1JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 18, at 836 (P. Tillers rev. 1983) ("[A]

party who has made an unsuccessful motion in limine to exclude evidence that he expects
the proponent to offer may be able to first offer that same evidence without waiving his
claim of error."); MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 103.4, at 17

(1981) ("However, the party may... himself bring out evidence ruled admissible over his
objection to minimize its effect without it constituting a waiver of his objection.") (footnotes
omitted)).
99. Id. at 1857 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 102).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1855.
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of a defendant's prior conviction is admissible, a defense attorney whose
client decides to testify is faced with a Hobson's choice: The attorney
can reveal the evidence on direct examination, thus losing the right to
appeal the possible erroneous ruling but retaining the opportunity to
reduce the sting of the evidence, or the attorney can wait until the
prosecutor reveals the evidence on cross-examination, thus preserving
the right to appeal but foregoing the opportunity to demonstrate that the
defendant has been forthcoming. Indeed, Ohler places the defendant in
the precarious situation of deciding between putting the best defense
forward at trial, by mitigating the sting of the conviction evidence, and
retaining the right to appeal the potentially erroneous ruling. How
should the practitioner resolve the dilemma?
Conventional trial strategy leans toward a presumption of "inoculating" the jury with bad facts on direct examination."° This inoculation
theory is based on the premise that a jury perceives the defendant as
more credible when he introduces evidence of damaging prior convictions
because the defendant has been forthcoming in admitting character and
behavior flaws. 10 5 However, a countervailing view known as the
sponsorship theory presumes that jurors actually do not perceive a
defendant to be more credible if he introduces a conviction himself
rather than awaiting its introduction by the Government. ° This
theory suggests that rather than highlighting weaknesses in one's own
case, the defendant should force the other side to elicit the potentially
damaging facts and to assume the burden of convincing the jury that
these facts are material.10 7 Indeed, the central premise of the sponsorship strategy is that "'the jury does not expect an advocate to go out of
his way to present evidence harmful to his case... [and] will not view
him as unfair if he fails to do so.""'
Thus, while the inoculation
theory advises a defendant to introduce all bad evidence to the jury up
front, the sponsorship theory advises a defendant not to solicit and
highlight bad evidence to the jury.'09

104. Robert H. Klonoff & Paul L. Colby, Responding to a May 2000 Legal Article: The
Flawed Empirical Testing of Sponsorship Strategy, 63 TEX. B.J. 754, 754 (2000).
105.

Id. at 754 n.2.

106. ROBERT H. KLONOFF & PAUL L. COLBY, SPONSORSHIP STRATEGY: EVIDENTIARY
TACTICS FOR WINNING JURY TRIALS (1990). See generally Paul L. Colby & Robert H.
Klonoff, Sponsorship Strategy: A Reply to Floyd Abrams and Professor Saks, 52 MD. L.

REV. 458 (1993).
107. Colby & Kionoff, supra note 106, at 459.
108. Id. at 461 (quoting KLONOFF & COLBY, SPONSORSHIP STRATEGY, supra note 106,
at 101. See Respondent's Brief, Ohler v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1851 (2000) (No. 98-

9828) (citing sponsorship theory text).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 103-07.
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Therefore, in consideration of the result of Ohler and of these
competing theories, a defense attorney is required to make a more
exacting analysis of the likelihood of a successful appeal of the trial
court's ruling on the motion in limine versus the perceived advantages
of disclosing the damaging evidence on direct examination. Because
evidentiary questions are subject to an abuse of discretion standard of
review, the more relevant the prior conviction is to credibility, the less
likely the trial judge's ruling will be reversed on appeal. Therefore, the
defense attorney may want to bring out crimes that are considered closer
to a defendant's credibility in greater detail on direct examination to
avail the defendant of the full opportunity to explain the prior conviction. In addition, the defense attorney should consider more carefully
how the failure to reveal each item of evidence could be assessed by the
jury. Indeed, the perceived value of early disclosure of this evidence is
that the jury will find the defendant more credible because the
defendant was honest and did not conceal damaging evidence in a selfpreserving manner.
In addition, a defense attorney may consider a number of factors
relating to the prior conviction in making the decision whether to elicit
it on direct examination. These factors, which the trial judge considers
in making the ruling to allow admissibility of the prior conviction,
include the nature of the prior crime, the similarity of the prior crime to
the present crime, the nearness or remoteness of the prior crime to the
present crime, and the extent to which the prior crime affects the
credibility of the defendant.110 If the crime the defendant was previously convicted of is similar, close in time, or relevant to the defendant's
credibility, the defense attorney may lean toward not bringing it out on
direct examination in the hopes that the prosecutor will not risk reversal
by bringing it out on cross-examination.
An alternative approach to the Ohler dilemma attempts to accommoThis techdate both inoculation and sponsorship considerations.'
nique would have the defense attorney ask the client on direct examination, "Do you understand that, because you have chosen to testify, the
prosecutor will be allowed to ask you things about your past that were
not part of their original case? Are you willing to answer her questions?" The defense attorney, after asking this question, would then not
elaborate in any further detail about the evidence. This technique
accommodates both of the opposing tactical theories while preserving
appellate possibilities: Objections made to the prior convictions will not

110. 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 609.3 (4th ed. 1996).
111. Interview with Deryl Dantzler, Professor of Trial Advocacy, Mercer Law School;
Dean of National Criminal Defense College (Feb. 2, 2001).
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be waived, but the defendant demonstrates forthrightness without
conceding to the jury any relevance to the evidence." 2
Essentially, the Supreme Court's holding in Ohler that a defendant
waives appellate review of a ruling allowing the government to impeach
the defendant with prior conviction evidence when this evidence is first
elicited by the defense puts an enormous burden on the defense attorney
to make very carefully the election whether to reveal or to conceal
evidence of a defendant's prior conviction on direct examination.
MIsTY DAwN GARRETT
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